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BLD-055        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1826 
___________ 
 
JOHN J. MCCARTHY, 
      Appellant 
    
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:14-cv-01910) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 19, 2015 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 25, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 John J. McCarthy appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because this appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  
I. 
 McCarthy is a federal prisoner serving a 235-month sentence imposed by the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for possession of a firearm by 
a convicted felon.  This appeal concerns a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, in which he alleged 
that his constitutional rights were violated during disciplinary proceedings that resulted, 
in pertinent part, in the loss of good conduct time.1  The Magistrate Judge issued a report 
recommending that McCarthy’s claims be denied as unexhausted and, alternatively, as 
meritless.  On March 16, 2015, after considering McCarthy’s objections, which were not 
specific, the District Court issued an order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
denying McCarthy’s § 2241 petition.   
 McCarthy appealed, and the Government has moved for summary affirmance of 
the District Court’s order. 
II. 
                                              
1 To the extent McCarthy challenges punishment that did not result in the loss of prison 
credit, those claims do not sound in habeas.  See Learner v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 
(3d cir. 2002).  In addition, McCarthy’s informal brief refers to a challenge about whether 
his federal time should run concurrent to a state sentence.  It does not appear he raised 
this issue before the District Court in this case, and, in any event, we recently addressed 
the issue in a separate appeal.  See C.A. No. 15-2339.  
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  We review the District 
Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  Denny v. 
Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013).  If no substantial question is presented, we 
may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; 
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  In this appeal, we need not 
address whether McCarthy properly exhausted his claims, as the claims are meritless.   
 A prisoner has a liberty interest in good conduct credit.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 557 (1974).  Thus, a disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of such 
credit must provide certain due process safeguards to a prisoner, including:  (1) at least 
24-hour advance notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present 
documentary evidence; and (3) a written decision explaining the evidence relied upon and 
the reasons for the disciplinary action.  Id. at 564-66.  The Supreme Court has held that 
“revocation of good time does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural 
due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some 
evidence in the record.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  This standard is minimal and “does not require 
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, 
or weighing of the evidence.”  Id. at 455.  Rather, the relevant inquiry “is whether there is 
any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 
                                              
2 McCarthy’s challenge to a disciplinary action resulting in the loss of good conduct 
time is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 
254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the 
denial of a § 2241 petition.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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board.”  Id., at 455-56. 
 Here, the Disciplinary Hearing Officers’ findings that McCarthy committed the 
violations that resulted in three disallowances of good conduct time were supported by 
“some evidence.”  Regarding the first incident, which took place May 21, 2014, 
McCarthy was accused of threatening bodily harm and refusing an order.  At the hearing, 
McCarthy received a staff representative, testified on his own behalf, and obtained 
testimony from another inmate.  In finding McCarthy committed the alleged violations, 
the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) relied on the eyewitness written account of the 
reporting officer and McCarthy’s own admission that he stuck his arm through the wicket 
and refused to remove it.  The “some evidence” standard may be satisfied solely by an 
incident report.  See Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2001); 
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).  In this case, however, the 
DHO also relied on McCarthy’s partial admission that he refused to remove his arm from 
the wicket.  Accordingly, the decision was supported by sufficient evidence to comply 
with the requirements of due process. 
 In the second incident, which took place June 1, 2014, McCarthy was accused of 
possessing a lock-picking device.  At the hearing, McCarthy, who appeared with a staff 
representative, admitted possessing the flattened AA battery terminal in question, but 
denied that it was a lock-picking device.  The DHO based his finding on the written 
eyewitness account of the reporting officer, a photograph of the object, and McCarthy’s 
testimony.  Accordingly, the decision was supported by sufficient evidence to comply 
with the requirements of due process. 
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 In the third incident in question, McCarthy was accused of threatening bodily 
harm and refusing to obey an order on July 30, 2014.  At the hearing, McCarthy, who 
waived the right to a staff representative, testified he wouldn’t submit to hand restraints.  
He denied threatening anybody.  Another inmate testified on McCarthy’s behalf that 
McCarthy did not make any threats while that inmate was present.  In finding McCarthy 
committed the violation, the DHO relied on the very specific, written statement from the 
reporting officer, as well as McCarthy’s partial admission that he refused to submit to 
hand restraints.  Accordingly, this decision, too, was supported by sufficient evidence to 
comply with the requirements of due process. 
 McCarthy’s general assertions that his rights were violated because the DHOs 
considered the adverse evidence to be more credible than his defenses does not disturb 
our conclusion.  A challenge to the weight accorded evidence is not relevant to the 
question of whether the decision was supported by “some evidence” because the standard 
does not require “weighing of the evidence.”  Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.  Furthermore, we 
note that the DHOs’ decisions complied with the requirement that a decision must be 
based on the “greater weight of the evidence” when conflicting evidence is presented.  28 
C.F.R. § 541.8(f).  The written decisions reflect that the conflicting evidence was 
considered, but that the DHOs found the greater weight of the evidence to indicate that 
McCarthy committed the alleged violations. 
 We also agree with the District Court that McCarthy’s due process rights were not 
violated by the hearing procedures.  Regarding the above hearings, McCarthy received 
notice, had an opportunity to present evidence and testify on his own behalf, and received 
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copies of the written decisions that explained the reasons for the loss of good conduct 
time.      
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
